Toward an account of gender identity by Jenkins, Katharine
Ergo AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Contact: Katharine Jenkins <katharine.jenkins@nottingham.ac.uk>
http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.027 713
Toward an Account of Gender 
Identity
K AT H A R I N E  J E N K I N S
University of Nottingham
Although the concept of gender identity plays a prominent role in campaigns for 
trans rights, it is not well understood, and common definitions suffer from a prob-
lematic circularity. This paper undertakes an ameliorative inquiry into the concept 
of gender identity, taking as a starting point the ways in which trans rights move-
ments seek to use the concept. First, I set out six desiderata that a target concept 
of gender identity should meet. I then consider three analytic accounts of gender 
identity: the dispositional account, the self- identification account, and the norm- 
relevancy account. I argue that only the norm- relevancy account can meet all six 
desiderata. Finally, I defend the norm- relevancy account from three objections: that 
it is cis- normative, that it has problematic implications regarding trans women, and 
that it entails that some people do not have the gender identity they take themselves 
to have.
1. Introduction: The Folk Concept of Gender Identity
The concept of gender identity has entered into increasing circulation in recent 
years, principally due to increasing awareness of gender diversity and to the 
greater prominence of campaigns for trans rights. The concept plays an impor-
tant role in these campaigns in two main ways. Firstly, it plays a crucial defini-
tional role: being trans is typically defined as ‘having a gender identity that is 
different from the gender one was assigned at birth’. Correspondingly, being cis 
is typically defined as ‘having a gender identity that is the same as the gender 
one was assigned at birth’. Thus, the concept of gender identity is used to de-
fine both trans identity and, by extension, trans rights. Secondly, campaigns for 
trans rights paradigmatically call for gender identity to be used as the basis for 
people’s access to, and treatment within, gendered social spaces— for example, 
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for trans people to be able to use the bathroom facilities that correspond to their 
gender identity, and to be addressed in ways that reflect their gender identity. 
Although it is important to recognise that campaigns for trans rights are by no 
means homogenous, the use of the concept of gender identity in these two ways 
is very widely shared.1
The most widely accepted definition of gender identity characterises it as 
‘a sense of oneself as a man, woman, or some other gender’.2 It will be immedi-
ately apparent to the reader that this ‘folk’ definition is not complete until some 
account is offered of what it is to have a sense of oneself as ‘a man, woman, or 
some other gender’. This is where the folk definition begins to run into difficul-
ties: no such account is usually offered as part of the definition, and there is no 
consensus on what kind of account might be appropriate. The difficulty is com-
pounded by the fact that many people who use the language of gender identity 
hold an understanding of what it is to be a ‘man, woman, or some other gender’ 
that is highly unsuited to supplementing the folk definition of gender identity. 
This is the view that gender terms such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ ought to be un-
derstood in terms of gender identity: to be a man is to identify as a man (or, to 
have a male gender identity);3 to be a woman is to identify as a woman (or, to 
have a female gender identity); to be a non- binary person is to identify as non- 
binary (or, to have a non- binary gender identity), and so on. The combination 
of this view with the folk definition of gender identity gives rise to a circularity: 
someone who asks what it means to say that a certain person ‘has a female gen-
der identity’ will be told that it means that that person has a sense of herself ‘as 
a woman’— but if the questioner then asks what a ‘woman’ is, they will be told 
that a woman is ‘a person with a female gender identity’. Thus, the questioner is 
none the wiser as to what it means to have a female gender identity.
I do not intend here to take a stance on whether or not gender terms should 
be used, in general, primarily to refer to gender identity.4 The point I wish to 
make is that even someone who thinks that gender terms should in general refer 
to gender identity must, on pain of circularity, allow that in the context of the defi-
1. See, e.g., https://transequality.org/; https://srlp.org/; http://www.hrc.org/explore/topic/
transgender; https://www.stonewall.org.uk/our-work/campaigns/come-out-trans-equality; 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/lgbti-rights.
2. See, e.g., http://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity-terminolo-
gy-and-definitions; http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/thesaurus/terms/1179; http://www.yogyakartaprin-
ciples.org/introduction/. Sometimes it is further specified that this sense is ‘inner’ or ‘personal’, 
and that it may not be the same as the gender the person is perceived as having or the gender they 
were assigned at birth.
3. In this paper I will use the phrase ‘X identifies as a man/woman’ and ‘X has a male/female 
gender identity’ interchangeably, taking them to mean exactly the same thing. This is purely for 
reasons of grammatical convenience; I am not, e.g., using ‘male/female’ as sex terms rather than 
gender terms.
4. I have argued elsewhere (Jenkins 2016) that they should.
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nition of gender identity, the idea of having a sense of oneself ‘as a man, woman or 
some other gender’ must be explained without reference to gender identity. The 
current lack of any widely accepted explanation of this idea, and the resulting 
circularity in the folk concept of gender identity, is a problem from the point of 
view of trans rights campaigners. It would, from that perspective, be beneficial 
to be able to explain what gender identity is to people who do not already un-
derstand the concept, in order that they can participate in movements for trans 
rights in an informed way.
The present moment, at which the concept of gender identity is rapidly per-
meating public consciousness, presents a particularly good opportunity for es-
tablishing a widespread and sound understanding. In order to take advantage of 
this opportunity, however, it is necessary to have a clear and non- circular defini-
tion of gender identity. Although, as we have seen, the folk concept of gender 
identity is not adequate in this regard, the fact that there is widespread agree-
ment on at least some of the work that the concept of gender identity ought to be 
able to do offers a promising starting point for expanding on the folk definition. 
Put simply, the thought is this: since we know something about how trans rights 
movements need to use the concept of gender identity, we can assess various 
possible ways of extending the folk definition in terms of how well suited they 
are to those uses, with a view to selecting the one that is best able to do the re-
quired work. This is my aim in this paper.
This approach is one that has been the subject of recent discussion within 
analytic philosophy, where it is known as prescriptive conceptual analysis (Burgess 
& Plunkett 2013), or as ameliorative inquiry (Haslanger 2012c). Burgess and Plun-
kett distinguish between two different kinds of projects of conceptual analysis: 
(i) descriptive, and (ii) prescriptive. In the former, descriptive project, we seek 
to discover how a concept is currently being employed, including what type or 
kind in the world (if any) it refers to; by contrast, in the prescriptive project we 
seek to identify which concept we ought to use given our purposes. Haslanger’s 
method of ameliorative inquiry, developed in her work on gender and race, is 
an example of prescriptive analysis. In ameliorative inquiry, we seek to identify 
which concept (or concepts)5 would be most helpful for us to use given certain 
political aims. The concept that an ameliorative inquiry results in is termed the 
‘target concept’. My aim, then, can be more precisely stated as follows: to iden-
tify the target concept of gender identity, given the shared aims of trans rights 
movements, where this is understood as a prescriptive endeavour.6
In adopting this aim, I do not intend to commit myself to the claim that only 
5. I have argued (Jenkins 2016) that ameliorative inquiries may ‘branch’ so as to deliver mul-
tiple target concepts, no one of which would be able to fulfil all the goals of the inquiry by itself.
6. Note that this is different from the descriptive endeavour of establishing what concept (or 
concepts) of gender identity is (or are) being used in trans rights movements.
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one concept of gender identity is needed. The phenomenon is a complex one, and 
it may well be that different concepts are needed to capture different aspects of it. 
This pluralism is compatible with the idea that it is strategically useful for trans 
rights movements to adopt a single definition of gender identity if one can be 
found that fits their purposes. It is to this latter idea only that I am committed. I 
will treat it as an open possibility that no definition exists that can do all the work 
that trans rights movements need it to do, in which case it might be necessary 
to adopt multiple definitions, perhaps distinguished by different terminology.
I begin by exploring in more detail the work that gender identity needs to 
do in trans rights movements so as to arrive at a set of six desiderata for a target 
concept of gender identity. I then assess the three existing accounts of gender 
identity in the analytic philosophical literature relative to these desiderata. I ar-
gue that one, which I term ‘the norm- relevancy account’, can, in a slightly modi-
fied form, meet all of the desiderata, and is therefore a good candidate for the 
target concept of gender identity. Finally, I defend the norm- relevancy account 
from three objections.
Before I embark on this task, two observations about my approach are in 
order. Firstly, note that I am simply aiming to establish which concept of gender 
identity is best able to do the work that trans rights movements, as they cur-
rently exist, need it to do. In other words, I am taking the aims of trans rights 
movements as a starting point for my inquiry. Given the development of the 
concept of gender identity with reference to the experiences of trans people and 
the importance of the concept in contemporary struggles for trans rights, this is 
a natural enough way to approach an ameliorative inquiry on this topic. It is not, 
however, without potential critics. Some feminists have claimed that feminist 
considerations entail that the concept of gender identity should be rejected alto-
gether as confused and harmful (for a striking example of this position, see Jef-
freys 2014). These claims have been robustly countered by those working from 
a transfeminist perspective (Bettcher 2009; 2014; Koyama 2006; Lester 2017; Se-
rano 2016). Feminists such as Jeffreys can be interpreted as suggesting, firstly, 
that feminist aims should motivate the ameliorative inquiry into gender identity, 
and, secondly, that an ameliorative inquiry motivated in that way will yield the 
conclusion that no concept of gender identity is required at all. Arguing against 
the claims of feminists such as Jeffreys is beyond the scope of this article. Al-
though I am fully convinced of the appropriateness of the aims of the trans rights 
movements, I make no claim to have justified those aims here. I merely seek to 
establish the concept of gender identity that is required to advance those aims.
Secondly, it must be acknowledged that in bringing the resources of analytic 
philosophy to bear on gender identity I am adopting an unusual approach to 
the topic. Although there is a substantial theoretical literature on gender iden-
tity in fields such as gender studies and trans studies (see, e.g., Namaste 2000; 
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Prosser 1998; Stone 2006; Stryker 1994) this topic has only recently begun to re-
ceive attention within analytic philosophy (Andler 2017; Bettcher 2017; Jenkins 
2016; McKitrick 2015). The appeal of adopting an approach informed by analytic 
philosophy is that, as we have seen, analytic philosophy has many resources 
to offer when it comes to conceptual analysis. By contrast, the strong influence 
of postmodernist and poststructuralist approaches on gender studies and trans 
studies means that the latter are typically more focused on phenomenological 
and deconstructionist investigations than on conceptual analysis, and are thus 
less likely to be aiming at, and so less likely to yield, a clear and non- circular 
definition of gender identity. Let me be clear that in my opinion there is room 
for a wide variety of different and valuable investigations into gender identity. 
In undertaking conceptual analysis of gender identity I intend merely to investi-
gate the benefits that this approach, which is under- explored in this context, can 
bring, and not to denigrate existing work on that topic which employs different 
methods.
2. Desiderata for a Target Concept of Gender Identity
What little work there is on gender identity in analytic philosophy has suffered 
from a striking lack of clarity as to whether it is descriptive or prescriptive in na-
ture. My own work is no exception; although I have previously set out a defini-
tion of gender identity as part of an ameliorative inquiry into the concept woman 
(Jenkins 2016), I did not make it clear whether the definition of gender identity 
I offered was intended to be ameliorative/prescriptive, or descriptive. Similarly, 
both McKitrick (2015) and Bettcher (2017) recommend their respective defini-
tions of gender identity for use without explicitly stating whether or not they are 
intended as target concepts or as concepts that capture current usage. Accord-
ingly, there is much work to be done in terms of establishing how an ameliora-
tive inquiry into gender identity should proceed.
In order to carry out an ameliorative project, it is first necessary to select a set 
of political aims that are to guide the project. As I have already made clear, the 
aims guiding the ameliorative project that I am undertaking in this paper are the 
aims of trans rights movements, which I take to be twofold: promoting the rights 
of trans people, and countering transphobia. The next task is to establish how 
these aims translate into specific desiderata for a target concept. In order to do 
this, it is necessary to look in more detail at the kind of work the concept of gen-
der identity is being required to do in trans rights movements, and at the kind of 
features it must have in order to do this work well. Accordingly, in this section I 
set out six desiderata for a target concept. The first three are based fairly directly 
on the claims made by trans rights campaigners about gender identity, and the 
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latter three rely to a greater extent on my own reasoning about what features a 
concept would need to have in order to do this work.7
As already mentioned, one of the main claims of trans rights movements 
is that trans people (and indeed everyone else) are entitled to be able to move 
through social space as members of their identified gender. For example, a trans 
woman should be able to access women- only spaces such as bathrooms, and 
should be addressed and described using female- specific language where rele-
vant.8 In the philosophical literature this claim has been supported by Stephanie 
Julia Kapusta (2016), who has argued that misgendering— failing to treat people 
as members of the gender with which they identify— causes psychological harms 
such as shame, anxiety, and depression; moral harms such as the undermining 
of self- respect; and political harms, such as oppression and domination (see also 
Bailey, Ellis, & McNeil 2014; Bettcher 2007; 2009).
The claim that misgendering causes harm is an empirical claim and will not 
be upheld by a definition of gender identity alone.9 However, in order to fully 
support trans rights movements’ claim that trans people should be treated as 
members of their identified genders, it is necessary to supplement the claim that 
misgendering causes harm with a further claim about the nature of the link with 
such harm. This is because one might think that misgendering is wrong because 
it causes harm, whilst thinking that these harms only follow due to misconcep-
tions or weaknesses on the part of the individual. Clearly, the claims of trans 
rights movements would be substantially weakened if they depended on the 
idea that trans people who are misgendered only suffer harm on the basis of 
their own disproportionate responses— an idea that I believe practically all trans 
rights campaigners would reject. Rather, the strongest case would rest on the 
premise that the harms suffered by those who are misgendered are an accurate 
reflection of the personal and social significance of gender identity. And here, the 
definition of gender identity does come into play: a definition of gender identity 
that makes it difficult to see why gender identity is important, significant, or de-
serving of respect would seriously undermine this premise. This points towards 
a first desideratum for a target concept of gender identity:
7. As already mentioned, trans rights movements are not homogenous. In what follows, I 
have restricted my focus to some basic claims that are very widely made by trans rights organiza-
tions. In addition to having found the claims in the materials of the organizations that are cited 
in each case, I am not aware of any trans rights organizations which dispute any of the claims I 
discuss.
8. See, e.g., https://transequality.org/; https://srlp.org/; http://www.hrc.org/explore/topic/
transgender; https://www.stonewall.org.uk/our-work/campaigns/come-out-trans-equality; 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/lgbti-rights.
9. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this point.
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D1.  The definition should render plausible the idea that gender identity 
is important and deserves respect.
Another key demand of trans rights movements is self- definition, the idea 
that people should have the right to declare what their gender identity is and to 
have this declaration treated as decisive. In particular, trans rights movements 
typically advocate for legal frameworks that allow people to change their official 
gender by means of a straightforward declaration, rather than having to produce 
evidence to show that they meet some set of criteria for warranting a change 
in their official gender.10 For example, the current UK legislation, the Gender 
Recognition Act of 2004, requires people seeking to change their official gender 
to submit ‘evidence’ to a panel of ‘experts’ showing that they have received a 
medical diagnosis of ‘gender dysphoria’ and have presented as the gender with 
which they identify for two years. Trans rights campaigners argue that this sys-
tem imposes unfair costs on applicants (financially, psychologically, and practi-
cally), and that it is demeaning and intrusive. They are calling for new legislation 
to implement a self- declaration model.11
This demand can be understood as a call for what Bettcher (2009) has de-
scribed as a norm of ‘First Person Authority’ (FPA), a principle stating that a 
person should be treated as the final and decisive authority on their own gender 
identity. Accordingly, we can add a second desideratum:
D2. The definition should be compatible with a norm of FPA.
It is worth noting that Bettcher distinguishes between an epistemic norm of 
FPA and an ethical norm of FPA. An epistemic norm of FPA is justified by the 
claim that the person who is accorded the FPA has a ‘serious epistemic advan-
tage’ (Bettcher 2009: 100) concerning the relevant subject matter compared to 
others, whereas an ethical norm of FPA is justified by the ethical badness of fail-
ing to treat the person’s avowals as decisive. Bettcher herself defends FPA as an 
ethical norm. She argues convincingly that a key aspect of transphobic oppres-
sion, and one that ties together many different manifestations of transphobia, 
including physical violence against trans people, is the mistaken belief that trans 
identities are inauthentic or invalid, and that trans people are either maliciously 
deceptive or tragically confused (Bettcher 2007; 2009). The ethical imperative for 
10. See, e.g., https://transequality.org/; https://srlp.org/; http://www.hrc.org/explore/topic/
transgender; https://www.stonewall.org.uk/our-work/campaigns/come-out-trans-equality; 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/issues/lgbti-rights.
11. See https://www.stonewall.org.uk/gender-recognition-act. At the time of writing, a gov-
ernment consultation has just opened on reforming the act.
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adopting a norm of FPA, according to Bettcher, stems from the need to coun-
teract these transphobic dynamics. An ethical norm of FPA can be defended by 
reference to the considerations Bettcher raises even if there is no reason to think 
that people are in a strongly privileged epistemic position with regard to their 
gender identity. I will leave it open what kind of norm of FPA the target concept 
of gender identity needs to uphold, since I take it that upholding either an ethi-
cal or an epistemic norm of FPA would be sufficient for the concept to do the 
required work. Note that upholding an ethical norm is much easier than uphold-
ing an epistemic norm: all that is necessary is that the account does not generate 
any reasons for rejecting FPA that are weighty enough to outweigh the ethical 
reasons in favour of it that are identified by Bettcher.
A third key demand of trans rights movements is affordable and non- 
burdensome access to transition- related healthcare (e.g., hormone therapy and 
surgeries such as double mastectomy with chest reconstruction or breast aug-
mentation, colloquially termed ‘top surgery’, and orchiectomy, vaginoplasty, or 
phalloplasty, colloquially termed ‘bottom surgery’) (Koyama 2006).12 In coun-
tries in which healthcare is provided by the state, such as the UK, this takes the 
form of advocating for transition- related healthcare to be provided by the na-
tional provider, whilst in countries in which healthcare is provided under insur-
ance, such as the US, this takes the form of advocating that insurers be required 
to cover transition- related healthcare under their policies. In both cases, as well 
as financial accessibility, trans rights advocates call for the removal of unnec-
essary and lengthy procedural barriers to accessing transition- related health-
care (Serano 2016). A major rationale for this demand is that delay in accessing 
transition- related healthcare has been shown to have a strong negative effect on 
the mental health of trans people (Bailey et al. 2014).
Intuitively, it seems as though this demand should feed in to the definition 
of gender identity. If the target concept of gender identity were completely de-
tached from the need for transition- related healthcare, it would be hard to up-
hold the seemingly obvious claim that good access to transition- related health-
care is properly understood as a trans rights issue. In other words, if it were seen 
as a complete coincidence that, for example, a particular individual (a) is a trans 
person with a male gender identity, and (b) feels a need for top surgery, it would 
be difficult to explain why his need to access to transition- related healthcare is 
connected to his social position as a trans person. We therefore need a desidera-
tum that links gender identity with the need for transition- related healthcare.
However, there are grounds for caution here. Some trans people do not wish 
to change any of their bodily features to reflect their gender identity, and others 
12. By ‘transition’ in the context of this paper I mean to refer to the process of seeking to move 
from being perceived and treated as a member of one gender category to being perceived and 
treated as a member of another gender category.
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wish to change some of the bodily features that are commonly associated with 
gender, but not others. It is therefore important that this desideratum be phrased 
in a way that avoids the implication that all trans people desire transition- related 
healthcare. In particular, we cannot require an account of gender identity to be 
able to justify the claim that (e.g.) a person with a male gender identity who has 
breasts automatically needs top surgery simply in virtue of his gender identity. Such 
an account would imply that those trans people who do not wish to change any 
of their bodily features are mistaken about their gender identity, thereby under-
mining FPA.
The following wording expresses the requisite caution:
D3.  The definition should be compatible with the idea that some trans 
people have a need for transition- related healthcare that is based on 
their gender identity.13
Having arrived at three desiderata from reflecting on the work that trans 
rights movements need gender identity to do, I will now propose three more 
desiderata based on the features that a target concept needs to have in order to 
do this work well. The first of these relates to the issue that motivates this paper: 
the circularity exhibited by the folk concept of gender identity. One barrier to 
the promotion of trans rights is a lack of understanding of trans experiences, 
including confusion about what it is to be a trans person. For example, a fairly 
common misconception is that all trans people have had, or plan to have, genital 
surgery. Clearly, increased understanding of what it is to be trans would aid 
the promotion of trans rights. Another change that would also help would be 
greater understanding and uptake of the term ‘cis’ to describe those whose gen-
der identity corresponds to the gender they were assigned at birth. This would 
have two benefits. First, it would reduce ‘othering’ of trans people: compare the 
importance of having a term, ‘heterosexual’, to refer to men who exclusively ex-
perience attraction to women and woman who exclusively experience attraction 
to men, rather than simply describing such people as ‘normal’. Second, it would 
13. This wording might be thought insufficiently demanding: it is often claimed by trans 
rights advocates that affordable and non- burdensome access to transition- related healthcare is 
not only a need but a right. Whilst I am extremely sympathetic to this claim, I note that any claim 
about rights raises general questions about what sort of thing a right is, the contexts within which 
rights apply, and how the corresponding obligations should be understood, which I cannot settle 
here. This is my reason for phrasing the desideratum in terms of needs rather than rights. More-
over, the language of need is, by itself, enough to rebut suggestions that a trans person’s request 
for transition related healthcare stems purely from, say, aesthetic preferences, rather than being 
something that is crucial for their wellbeing. Further work in advocating for a right to transition- 
related healthcare is a separate (though important) project that builds upon the idea of a need for 
transition- related healthcare. I am grateful to Aness Webster for pressing me on this point.
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facilitate greater attention to the phenomenon of cis privilege, that is, the fact 
that one’s life is likely to be easier in a number of ways, large and small, if one is 
cis as opposed to trans.
Since the concept of gender identity plays a prominent role in accounts of 
what it is to be trans or cis, one key function that the concept of gender identity 
should perform is to help increase understanding of these terms among those 
not yet familiar with them. Clearly, a circular or unclear concept cannot do this. 
Having a clear and non- circular definition of gender identity is also necessary if 
the concept is to be deployed in legal contexts, which is something at which trans 
rights campaigns regularly aim.
Accordingly the fourth desideratum is:
D4. The definition should be clear and non- circular.
Some caution is needed here. An unfortunate and wide- spread attitude takes 
the legitimacy of trans identities to be dependent on the recognition of cis peo-
ple. In other words, many seem to think that in order to be valid, trans identities 
must be rendered intelligible from a cis perspective. This is of course profoundly 
at odds with the aim of countering transphobia (Bettcher 2009; Scheman 1997; 
Stone 2006; Stryker 1994). Let me make it absolutely clear, then, that I take the 
value of a greater general understanding of gender identity to stem from the 
likely beneficial effects this would have for movements to advance trans rights, 
and not from any implication such an understanding might be supposed to have 
for the legitimacy of trans identities.
A fifth desideratum is needed to reflect the fact that some trans people are 
non- binary, which is to say they have a gender identity that is not ‘man’ or 
‘woman’. Although some people identify as ‘non- binary’ specifically, the term 
‘non- binary’ can also function as an umbrella term for all identities other than 
‘man’ and ‘woman’; this includes identities such as ‘agender’ (having no gen-
der), ‘genderfluid’ (moving between genders) and ‘genderqueer’ (calling into 
question received notions of gender). In this paper I shall primarily use ‘non- 
binary’ in its umbrella sense. Since some trans people are non- binary, it is clear 
that an account of gender identity that did not fit well with the identities and 
experiences of non- binary people could not be effective in securing and improv-
ing the rights of all trans people.14 Accordingly, we can add a fifth desideratum:
14. It is worth mentioning that although all non- binary people can be considered trans in the 
sense that they have a gender identity other than the gender that were assigned at birth (given that 
very nearly all infants are assigned either a male or a female gender at birth), not all non- binary 
people consider themselves to be trans or find the notion of being trans illuminating or relevant 
with respect to their own experiences.
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D5.  The definition should apply equally well to binary and non- binary 
identities.
A final desideratum is needed to reflect the fact that transfeminist approach-
es are, and have long been, a key part of trans rights movements (Bettcher 2007; 
2014; Koyama 2006; Serano 2016). Transfeminist approaches are committed to 
analysing gender- based oppression in a way that understands transphobia and 
misogyny as intimately related in complex ways, with particular attention to 
the experiences of those situated at the intersection of these oppressions, that 
is, trans women. Transfeminists argue that paying attention to the dynamics 
of transmisogyny— the specific combination of transphobia and misogyny that 
is directed at trans women— alerts us to various important features of gender- 
based oppression as a whole, and points towards solutions that are emancipa-
tory for people of all genders, whether trans or cis. An account of gender identity 
that was incompatible with transfeminist approaches would instigate a signifi-
cant split within trans rights movements, and would also make it difficult for 
those movements to work in concert with other feminist movements. This would 
be highly counterproductive.
In order to be compatible with transfeminist approaches, a definition of gen-
der identity must be friendly to critiques of current gender norms and social 
structures that go beyond the fact that these norms frequently miscategorize 
trans people. Accordingly, the final desideratum is:
D6.  The definition should combine well with broader critiques of current 
gender norms and social structures.
Thus, the six desiderata that I will use to assess possible target concepts of 
gender identity are as follows:
D1:  The definition should render plausible the idea that gender identity 
is important and deserves respect.
D2: The definition should be compatible with a norm of FPA.
D3:  The definition should be compatible with the idea that some trans 
people have a need for transition- related healthcare that is based on 
their gender identity.
D4: The definition should be clear and non- circular.
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D5:  The definition should apply equally well to binary and non- binary 
identities.
D6:  The definition should combine well with broader critiques of current 
gender norms and social structures.
3. Existing Accounts of Gender Identity
I will now consider the three accounts of gender identity that have been put 
forward in the analytic philosophy literature and assess how well each of them 
meets the five desiderata. For reasons of space, I will not consider all six of the 
desiderata in relation to each account, but will in some cases focus only on the 
main strengths and weaknesses. It is important to note that there is no reason to 
think that the authors I survey are themselves committed to all (or even any) of 
the desiderata I have set out thus far, and that accordingly my discussion tells us 
nothing about whether these accounts succeed by their own lights.
3.1. The Dispositional Account
According to McKitrick (2015), gender identity consists of a disposition or clus-
ter of dispositions to behave in ways that are perceived as gendered in the social 
context within which the subject is situated.15 These dispositions are contrasted 
with actual behaviour:
Being gendered is not exclusively a matter of how one is actually behav-
ing currently, but also a matter of how one is disposed to behave. These 
dispositions can be masked, or overpowered by other dispositions— 
dispositions to bow to social pressure, or pursue incompatible goals. 
(McKitrick 2015: 2579)
It is important to note that McKitrick remains neutral on the origin of these 
dispositions (2015: 2580).
Here is McKitrick’s definition in full:
x is gender G iff
x has (sufficiently many, sufficiently strong) dispositions D1 . . . Dn to 
behave in ways B1 . . . Bn in situations S1 . . . Sn, and
15. In the main body of the paper, McKitrick refers to ‘gender’, rather than ‘gender identity’, 
but she makes it clear at the outset that she is referring to gender in the sense of ‘gender identity’ 
(2015: 2577).
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The relevant social group considers behaving in ways B1 . . . Bn in 
situations S1 . . . Sn to be G.
The relevant behaviors could include modes of dress, posture and 
mannerisms, productive and leisure time activities, styles of communica-
tion and social interaction. . . . Candidates for gender G include ‘mascu-
line,’ ‘feminine,’ ‘trans,’ ‘queer,’ etc. (2015: 2581)16
Importantly, McKitrick conceives of these dispositions as extrinsic, in the 
sense that they are about a person considered in a particular context and their 
relationship to that context.
First, the definition’s strengths. McKitrick’s definition avoids the circularity 
that threatens the folk concept of gender identity by giving independent con-
tent to the gender terms that appear in the definition of gender identity. Recall 
the folk definition: ‘Gender identity is a sense of oneself as a man, woman, or 
some other gender.’ For McKitrick, the content of gender terms that appear in 
this definition is set by the behaviours that the relevant social group consider 
to be characteristic of that gender group. According to McKitrick, then, to say 
that someone has a female gender identity is to say that she has dispositions to 
behave in ways that people in her social context consider to be feminine, that 
is, characteristic of women. This tells us what gender identity is without ap-
pealing to the concept of gender identity, thus avoiding circularity and meet-
ing D4.
The definition can also meet D5, the requirement to apply equally well to 
binary and non- binary people. If there are stereotypes about non- binary people 
in a given social context, then the definition can handle non- binary identities in 
the same way as it handles binary identities. If there are no such stereotypes— for 
example, if the context is one where non- binary identities are hardly acknowl-
edged to exist and the only stereotypes concern masculine and feminine ways of 
behaving— then non- binary identities cannot be treated the same way as binary 
identities. However, the account can easily be extended to allow for non- binary 
identities to be defined relative to those identities for which there are stereo-
types. For example, one might say that if someone has no dispositions to behave 
either in ways considered masculine or in ways considered feminine, then they 
have an agender gender identity. So the dispositional account does well with 
regard to both D4 and D5.
However, the dispositional account also has some serious weaknesses.17 
Consider D1, the requirement that the definition render plausible the idea that 
16. Note that treating ‘trans’ as a gender, as McKitrick does here, is controversial; most trans 
people do not consider their gender to be ‘trans’ but rather ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘genderqueer’, etc.
17. Recall that these are weaknesses as a potential target concept for the current ameliorative in-
quiry; they may not be weaknesses relative to other purposes and commitments.
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gender identity is important and deserves respect. The dispositional account 
might initially appear to meet this desideratum, because being forced to behave 
contrary to one’s dispositions is a cost— and so it would seem that a person’s 
dispositions relative to gender norms (i.e., their gender identity, according to 
the dispositional account) are important and deserve respect. However, prob-
lems arise when we consider D6— the need to allow for critical stances towards 
gender norms— alongside D1. The shared beliefs about typical behaviour for dif-
ferent genders— let us call these ‘gender stereotypes’— that serve as a point of 
reference for the dispositions on which McKitrick focuses are both contingent 
and regarded by many as highly problematic. Yet if we adopt a critical stance 
towards these stereotypes, it is difficult to also view our dispositions to behave 
in ways that align with certain of these stereotypes as either important or deserv-
ing of respect.
An example may help. Suppose there is a society which is divided into aris-
tocrats and peasants, and in which different modes of dress, posture and man-
nerisms, productive and leisure time activities, and so on are associated with 
these social classes. (Needless to say, this is a very unjust society.) Further sup-
pose that people have dispositions to behave in these kinds of ways. It is hard 
to see why any significance or respect should be attached to these dispositions. 
Certainly, someone who claimed that it was important for them to continue to 
be treated as an aristocrat (e.g., addressed with the typical forms of address for 
addressing an aristocrat) due to their aristocratic dispositions would not have 
a compelling claim to be so treated. If we adopt a critical stance towards gen-
der norms, then the disposition account places gender identity on a structurally 
similar footing as aristocratic or peasant identity in this scenario. Therefore, the 
dispositional account can either show that gender identity is important and de-
serves respect, or allow for critical stances towards gender norms; it cannot do 
both. There is thus at least one desideratum that the account cannot meet.
3.2. The Self- Identification Account
A recent proposal from Bettcher (2017) marks a distinct and novel approach to 
conceptualizing gender identity. She introduces it as follows:
The cleanest move may well be to avoid [the issues raised by other ac-
counts of gender identity] altogether through an appeal to sincere self- 
identification. Admittedly, this means trans women who don’t yet self- 
identify as women aren’t yet women (in this sense). That said, once she 
does self- identify as a woman, she may well re- assess her entire life by 
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saying she’s always been a woman (something we should respect too). 
(Bettcher 2017: 396)18
Based on Bettcher’s other work (2009), I understand ‘self- identification’ here to 
mean claiming, or being disposed to claim in relevant circumstances, that one is 
a person of a certain gender. On this account, to have a female gender identity is 
to be someone who is disposed to reply to the question, ‘What is your gender?’, 
with the statement, ‘I am a woman’ (or words to that effect) and to be acting in 
good faith in doing so. Here, then, self- identification refers to the act of express-
ing or claiming a certain identity, or, at least, being disposed to make such ex-
pressions or claims.
The self- identification account is a rather deflationary way of thinking 
about gender identity. In common parlance, gender identity is usually thought 
of as the property of a person that makes them inclined to engage in certain acts 
of self- identification and that is expressed when they do engage in acts of self- 
identification. The dispositional account, for example, aligns with this idea. By 
contrast, the self- identification account equates gender identity with sincere self- 
identification. This move distances the account from the idea that there is any 
reasonably unified property that can be thought to underlie different acts of self- 
identification.
A major strength of the self- identification account is that it meets D2, the 
need to be compatible with a norm of FPA. As we saw in Section 2, Bettcher 
supports an ethical norm of FPA rather than an epistemic norm. The self- 
identification account is clearly compatible with ethical FPA: nothing in the ac-
count weighs against a practice of treating people’s declarations of their own 
gender as authoritative— quite the reverse. Moreover, the account can even sup-
port the more demanding epistemic norm of FPA, since it renders it impossible 
for a person to be mistaken about their own gender identity at a given moment 
in time. The account thus offers a very pronounced form of privileged epistemic 
access, at least synchronically. The account also unequivocally meets D5, the 
requirement to be equally applicable to non- binary identities, and it is clearly 
compatible with D6, the need to allow for critical stances towards gender norms: 
since the account makes no reference to gender norms, it presents no barrier to 
critiquing those norms.
Nevertheless, the self- identification account also has some significant weak-
nesses. Most importantly, it fares very poorly at showing that gender identity is 
18. Bettcher’s wording in presenting the account is slightly equivocal: although it is clear that 
she recommends the account as a solution to certain difficulties with other accounts, it is not quite 
clear whether she fully endorses it.
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important and deserves respect (D1). As we have seen, on this account gender 
identity is equated with a disposition to make certain kinds of assertions. This 
means that the account makes gender identity seem trivial: why should we care 
about dispositions to utter certain sentences? Insofar as we care about gender iden-
tity we seem intuitively care about it as whatever it is that makes people want to utter 
those sentences, or whatever it is that they express when they do utter them. It is not 
simply that the self- identification account needs to say more in order to explain 
how gender identity is important and deserves respect, but rather that it is difficult 
to see how the account can ever say more on this, due to its minimalist stance.
The self- identification account also struggles with D3, compatibility with 
possible need for transition- related healthcare: it is difficult to perceive any re-
lationship at all between a linguistic disposition and the sort of felt need for 
one’s body to be different that would prompt the desire to access transition- 
related healthcare. Again, it is hard to imagine what might be added to the self- 
identification account to enable it to meet this desideratum.19 There are, then, 
two desiderata which the self- identification account seems unable to meet.
3.3. The Norm- Relevancy Account
In previous work (Jenkins 2016), I have offered an account of gender identity 
that, like the dispositional account, appeals to social norms about how members 
of various genders ought to be, and uses those norms to give content to gender 
terms as they appear in the definition of gender identity. In contrast to McKit-
rick, however, my account focuses on a relationship to these norms that is much 
looser than a disposition to comply with them, namely, the fact that someone 
experiences those norms as relevant to them. On my account, which I will describe as 
the ‘norm- relevancy account’, to say that someone has a female gender identity 
is to say that she experiences the norms that are associated with women in her 
social context as relevant to her.
The account begins with a picture of the way that agents interact with the 
norms governing social space. This picture is explained by way of a metaphor 
borrowed from William E. Cross via Haslanger (2012a), that of an embodied 
‘map’ of social space that is calibrated relative to one or another set of social 
norms. The idea conveyed by this metaphor is that a person typically has an 
19. It might seem that the self- definition account also struggles with D4 (non- circularity). 
However, the account (as I have interpreted it) is not circular. It does not explain self- identification 
by referring back to gender identity; rather, it declines to explain it at all. Gender identity is simply 
equated with disposition to sincerely utter sentences such as ‘I am a non- binary person’, such that 
no stipulation is made about what a person intends to convey by making such utterances. It would 
be a mistake to take the account’s minimalism for circularity.
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internalised sense of the norms operating in social spaces that they regularly 
navigate, and the implications of those norms for the status of their own behav-
iour as norm- compliant or norm- violating, where this sense can be thought of 
by analogy with annotations made on a personal copy of a standard- issue map 
of the physical region.
To take a very basic example, suppose that a woman, a man, and a non- 
binary person all work in the same building, and each is given a map of that 
building and asked to annotate it in ways that indicate how they experience 
different spaces. The woman’s map might have the female toilets marked as a 
space where she is able to go and the male toilets marked a space where she 
is not able to go; the man’s map might be the opposite way around; and (as-
suming, as is sadly common, that the building lacks gender- neutral toilets) the 
non- binary person’s map might have all toilets marked as uncomfortable plac-
es fraught with stress and danger. This example concerns explicitly gendered 
spaces, but we can extend it to apply to spaces that are not explicitly gendered. 
Suppose that the workplace is a hostile environment for women— specifically, 
in meetings, women are regularly talked over, ignored, or belittled. In this 
case, the meeting room might be marked as ‘somewhere I am not supposed to 
speak much’ on a woman’s map, but not on a man’s map. Or think of the way 
that a woman might experience certain streets as ‘no- go’ areas during certain 
times of day, whereas a man might feel fine walking in those streets regardless 
of the time of day.
The map is tacit in the sense that people are not always explicitly aware of the 
way they experience social spaces, and it is embodied in the sense that responses 
to interactions with norms can produce bodily responses. For example, entering 
a space that is designated on your ‘map’ as a ‘no- go’ area for people like you 
might result in feelings of bodily awkwardness, tension, and even the physi-
ological responses associated with fear.
Importantly, a person’s gender ‘map’ need not correspond to the way one 
is seen by others; a person might know that other people judge their behaviour 
by reference to norms of (say) masculinity, but their own sense of whether their 
behaviour is norm- compliant or norm- violating may take norms of femininity as 
a reference point. Again, this need not be something they are consciously aware 
of. An example of the kind of ‘sense’ I have in mind can be found in Julia Se-
rano’s description of her experience as a child who had been assigned male at 
birth (she later came to identify as a woman):
I had an unexplainable feeling that I was doing something wrong every 
time I walked into the boys’ restroom at school; and whenever our class 
split into groups of boys and girls, I always had a sneaking suspicion that 
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at any moment someone might tap me on the shoulder and say, “Hey, 
what are you doing here? You’re not a boy.” (Serano 2016: 78)20
Clearly, any given person’s ‘map’ will be highly intersectional, since social 
spaces are governed by norms about many aspects of social identity other than 
gender, and these norms interact with, and indeed co- construct, one another in 
complex ways. For example, a black woman might experience the meeting room 
as hostile in different and more pronounced ways compared to how a white 
woman experiences it.
These ideas are expressed in the formal definition I offer of the concept of 
gender identity:
S has a gender identity of X iff S’s internal ‘map’ is formed to guide some-
one classed as a member of X gender through the social or material reali-
ties that are, in that context, characteristic of Xs as a class. (Jenkins 2016: 
410)
This definition makes reference to a notion of gender ‘classes’; by this I mean, 
following Haslanger (2012a), social roles that are both (a) coercively imposed 
on the basis of perceived relationship to possibilities of biological reproduction, 
and (b) hierarchical in nature such that members of the masculine category are 
privileged and members of the feminine category are subordinated.
The overall picture that emerges from the norm- relevancy account is as fol-
lows: there are social practices that position people as members of certain hier-
archical gender classes. Each of these gender classes is the locus of a complex set 
of norms about how occupants of that class ought to be and ought to behave. 
In contemporary Western society, these norms include norms about personal-
ity, occupation, hobbies, modes of interaction, and modes of self- presentation. 
They also include norms about bodies— for instance, the norm that men should 
have penises and should not have breasts, and the norm that women should 
have vulvas and should not have beards. Against this backdrop, people have an 
inner sense of their own ‘locatedness’ with regard to these norms, which might 
diverge from the way they are in fact positioned. When they experience their 
own behaviour as norm- compliant or norm- violating, one or another set of these 
norms is functioning as the benchmark for (non- )compliance.
Crucially, I understand ‘experiencing a norm to be relevant to oneself’ to 
be perfectly compatible with behaving in contravention of that norm and with 
disapproving of that norm. To illustrate what it might be for someone to experi-
20. Serano herself would not describe this sense as gender identity, because she reserves the 
term for ‘the way [one] consciously relate[s] to [one’s] own gender’. Instead, she describes it as one 
consequence of what she terms ‘subconscious sex’ (Serano 2016: 81– 83).
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ence a norm as relevant to them whilst disapproving of it and not complying 
with it, I offer the case of a woman who does not remove body hair from her legs 
(2016: 411– 412). Such a woman may well experience an awareness of the norm- 
violating nature of this aspect of her bodily presentation even if she is happy 
with her choice not to remove her leg- hair, and even if she has a strongly criti-
cal attitude towards the relevant norms. For example, she might feel conscious 
of her hairy legs when she wears clothing that reveals them in a way that she 
would not feel conscious if she had hairless legs, even if this consciousness is 
something she experiences positively, as an enjoyable sense of transgression or 
rebellion. This awareness of the norm- violating nature of her leg- hair, I contend, 
is something the woman can only have in dependence on experiencing her be-
haviour in relation to the norms associated with women, since only those norms 
direct that legs should be hairless.21
A defender of the norm- relevancy account need not be committed to the 
claim that gender norms are uniform across social space. The social expectations 
placed on women, for example, vary between different communities, and are 
heavily inflected by interlocking norms about race, class, sexuality, and so on. 
Thus, it would be vanishingly unlikely that a person would take all of the norms 
associated with women to be relevant to her. Moreover, that type of compre-
hensive relevancy relationship is not required. As I intend the norm- relevancy 
account, for a person to have (say) a female gender identity, she simply needs to 
take some significant subset of the norms associated with women be relevant to 
her, and not to take a greater subset of the norms associated with another gender 
role to be relevant to her.22
Because I will argue that the norm- relevancy account meets all six of the de-
siderata, in some cases with minor additions, I will consider each desideratum 
in turn rather than focusing on strengths and weaknesses.
D1:  The definition should render plausible the idea that gender identity 
is important and deserves respect.
In order to see how the norm- relevancy account makes sense of the idea that 
gender identity is important and deserves respect, we need to consider what 
21. Note that the norm- relevancy account differs from the dispositional account in that it 
does not tie gender identity to a disposition to behave in ways that are regarded as masculine or 
feminine: one can experience a norm as relevant to oneself without having a disposition to behave 
in the way that the norm demands.
22. I lack the space to explore in any detail the issue of exactly how large this subset needs to 
be. It seems likely that the relevant requirement would need to involve both the size of the subset 
relative to the norms of femininity operating in that context, and the size of the subset relative to 
the size of other subsets of gender norms the person also experiences as relevant. I am grateful to 
an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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Alissa Bierria has termed ‘the social dialectic of agency’ (2014: 131). Bierria ob-
serves that although it seems natural to many to locate agency solely within the 
agent herself, in fact our understanding of agency in a social context should ex-
tend to the reception of the action by observers. In general, an agent not only acts 
intentionally, she also acts on the presumption that her act will communicate to 
observers at least roughly what she meant it to, including at least a partially ac-
curate sense of her intentions in so acting. In this sense, the acts we end up per-
forming are co- constructed by ourselves and by others around us who perceive 
those acts. As Bierria puts it, ‘even if an agent develops her intentions and acts 
accordingly, others who observe the agent’s action also construct narratives of 
meaning about her actions, empowering them as social authors of her autono-
mous action’ (2014: 131).
According to the norm- relevancy account, to have a certain gender identity 
(‘woman’, for example) is to experience one’s actions as norm- compliant or norm- 
violating with respect to the norms for that gender, rather than the norms for any 
other gender. For example, a person with a female gender identity in a European 
or American society would tend to experience wearing a dress as norm- compliant 
behaviour, rather than as norm- violating behaviour. Now suppose that such a 
person is perceived by others as a man— in other words, her gender identity is 
not respected— and that she wears a smart dress to a relatively formal occasion, 
such as a university graduation. Her intention, let us suppose, is to dress in an 
aesthetically pleasing but not particularly remarkable way that is sensitive to the 
formality of the occasion. Those observing her, however, interpret her as dressing 
in an extremely conspicuous and deliberately challenging way that undermines 
the formality of the occasion. This is because whilst wearing a smart dress to an 
occasion of this sort is norm- compliant relative to the norms of femininity, it is 
highly transgressive relative to the norms of masculinity. Thus, there is a marked 
disconnect between the intended and the perceived meaning of this agent’s action. 
Continuously experiencing this sort of disconnect amounts to a serious form of 
social disempowerment. To employ terminology that Bierria borrows from María 
Lugones (2003), it constitutes ‘disenfranchisement’, a deprivation of the authority 
to prompt social recognition of one’s intentions (Bierria 2014: 132).
The norm- relevancy account of gender identity shows that gender identity is 
important and deserves respect because disrespect for a person’s gender identity 
leads to disenfranchisement of the kind identified by Lugones and Bierria.
D2: The definition should be compatible with a norm of FPA.
Compatibility with an ethical norm of FPA requires only that an account does 
not offer any reasons against FPA that would outweigh the ethical consider-
ations in favour of it. The norm- relevancy account meets this standard.
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Previously (Jenkins 2016), I took the norm- relevancy account to be com-
patible with an epistemic norm of FPA. I claimed that it entails that everyone 
in fact has the gender identity that they take themselves to have— a strong 
form of epistemic privilege that would justify an epistemic norm of FPA. 
However, Bettcher (2017) has pointed out that the account does not yield the 
expected results about the gender identities of some trans people. Bettcher 
gives the example of a trans woman who has just begun to present herself 
outwardly as a woman. She asserts that such a woman might potentially turn 
out to have a gender ‘map’ that is organised around the norms that are ap-
plied to men in her social context— presumably, because these are the norms 
that have been applied to her by others all her life until now.23 Thus, it seems 
that some people might have a gender ‘map’ that is not aligned with the 
norms of the gender with which they consciously identify. In light of this, 
and contrary to my previous claims, it is clear that the norm- relevancy ac-
count does not entail that everyone is always right about their own gender 
identity, and therefore does not secure the strong epistemic privilege needed 
to support an epistemic norm of FPA. However, the norm- relevancy account 
still meets the less- demanding standard of compatibility with ethical FPA, 
and therefore satisfies D2.24
D3:  The definition should be compatible with the idea that some trans 
people have a need for transition- related healthcare that is based on 
their gender identity.
Currently, gender norms include norms about how bodies should be. For ex-
ample, ‘men should not have breasts’ is a gender norm currently in operation 
in mainstream contexts in Western society. These norms provide a link between 
gender identity and those properties of the body usually considered to be sex 
characteristics. A person who identifies as a man may well experience the norm 
‘men should not have breasts’ as relevant to him.25 It is natural to think that feel-
ing that one’s body transgresses a norm that one experiences as relevant to one-
self may be distressing to some people. This allows us to make sense of the idea 
23. A similar point is made by Matthew Salett Andler (2017) although Andler’s expression of 
the point rests on a misunderstanding of my view; see Section 4.1 below.
24. Establishing that the norm- relevancy account entailed that everyone has the gender iden-
tity that they think they have was important for the purposes of that paper because I was seeking 
to solve the ‘inclusion problem’, the challenge of finding an appropriately inclusive concept of 
‘woman’ for use in feminist practice. Since that time, Mari Mikkola has argued, in my view con-
vincingly, that the inclusion problem rests on a confusion and can therefore be deflated rather than 
solved (2016: Chapter 5).
25. Although he need not do so; a person does not have to experience all the norms associated 
with masculinity as relevant to himself in order to have a male gender identity.
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that (e.g.) if a person with a male gender identity feels the need for top surgery, 
this is related to his gender identity.
Note that the dispositional account does not justify the claim that a person 
with a male gender identity who has breasts necessarily needs top surgery sim-
ply in virtue of his gender identity. For one thing, it is possible to experience a norm 
as relevant to oneself without wishing to comply with it. For another, there is 
no general principle that people should be helped to bring their bodies into line 
with all of the norms they experience as relevant— and indeed, many people 
would (rightly, in my view) be extremely wary of such a principle, particularly 
with reference to disabled embodiment but perhaps also with reference to beau-
ty norms. This is in line with how D3 is stated (see Section 2 above), so the norm- 
relevancy account meets this desideratum.
D4: The definition should be clear and non- circular.
The norm- relevancy account of gender identity spells out the folk concept in 
more detail: it equates ‘having a sense of oneself’ as a particular gender with 
experiencing the norms associated with that gender in one’s cultural context 
as relevant to one. It avoids circularity because these norms are not defined in 
terms of gender identity but in terms of gender classes, which are understood to 
be based on social practices, structures, and arrangements. Thus, the account is 
clear and non- circular.
D5:  The definition should apply equally well to binary and non- binary 
identities.
I take it that there are, in many if not most contexts, currently no gender class-
es, and indeed no imposed social roles at all (hierarchical or otherwise), that 
are associated with non- binary identities. It may be difficult to see, then, how 
the norm- relevancy account can accommodate non- binary gender identities: in 
many contexts, the relevant gender classes are simply not out there in the world, 
available for the definitions to refer to, in the way that the classes ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ are available. However, this does not mean that the norm- relevancy 
account is unable to accommodate non- binary identities, because the strategy of 
referring to gender classes to define gender identity does not have to depend on 
a straightforward 1:1 correspondence between the identity and some particular 
gender class. Rather, it just needs to be a way of locating the identity with refer-
ence to some existing gender class or classes.
In my previous work, I was only able to address this point in passing. I sug-
gested that in contexts where there are no non- binary gender classes, non- binary 
gender identities can be identified by contrast to the classes of ‘man’ and ‘wom-
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an’ (Jenkins 2016: 410, Footnote 40). (In contexts where there are non- binary so-
cial roles, the solution is of course more straightforward.) Clearly, however, this 
needs spelling out in more detail for the present purposes. In order to do this, 
I will add a second metaphor to the norm- relevancy account besides the one of 
‘maps’ discussed above.
Imagine that injunctions about how people of different genders are sup-
posed to behave are broadcast on different radio frequencies, and each person 
has a radio that can be tuned in to different frequencies. Suppose there are just 
two channels: the ‘woman’ channel, and the ‘man’ channel. A person’s radio 
can be tuned in to the ‘woman’ channel, or it can be tuned to the ‘man’ channel, 
but these are not the only two possibilities. The radio could switch back and 
forth between the channels, or it could be a special radio capable of playing two 
channels simultaneously, or it could be tuned to a frequency between the two so 
that both channels come through in unusual and mingled ways, or it could be 
tuned to no channel at all.26 This provides a model for thinking about how even 
if there are (in a certain social context) only imposed social roles for two genders, 
a person can still have a non- binary gender identity in the sense defined by the 
norm- relevancy account.27
Here is a definition of non- binary gender identities, conceived of as an um-
brella term referring to all gender identities other than ‘man’ and ‘woman’:
A subject S has a non- binary gender identity iff S’s internal ‘map’ is nei-
ther formed so as to guide someone classed as a woman through the so-
cial or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of women 
as a class, nor formed to guide someone classed as a man through the 
social or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of men 
as a class.
More precise definitions of particular non- binary gender identities can be given 
as follows:
S has a genderfluid gender identity iff S’s internal ‘map’ is at times 
formed so as to guide someone classed as a woman through the social 
or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of women as 
a class, and at other times formed to guide someone classed as a man 
26. These possibilities are intended to express, respectively, genderfluid identity, bigender 
identity, genderqueer identity, and agender identity.
27. A further benefit of the radio metaphor is that it conveys the difference between experienc-
ing a norm as relevant to oneself and following a norm more clearly than the map metaphor does: one 
can be tuned in to the woman channel without actually obeying any of the injunctions that are 
broadcast on it.
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through the social or material realities that are, in that context, character-
istic of men as a class.
S has an agender gender identity [or: S lacks a gender identity] iff S does 
not have an internal ‘map’ that functions to guide them through the so-
cial or material realities that are, in that context, characteristic of any gen-
der class.
I cannot here give a full explanation of the many non- binary gender identity 
terms that are in use, but the three definitions offered here should suffice to 
show that the norm- relevancy account does not have a general difficulty in in-
cluding non- binary gender identities.28
D6: The definition should combine well with broader critiques of current 
gender norms and social structures.
The norm- relevancy account very clearly meets this desideratum, because it ac-
tually incorporates such critiques via the notion of gender classes.
4. Defending the Norm- Relevancy Account
The previous section shows that the norm- relevancy account satisfies all six of 
the desiderata, in one case (D5) with a slight extension, whilst both the disposi-
tional account and the self- identification account are unable to meet one or more 
of the desiderata. Clearly the norm- relevancy account is the best candidate for 
the target concept of gender identity (within the present ameliorative inquiry) 
out of the three existing accounts. In order to establish just how strong a can-
didate the norm- relevancy is, however, it is necessary to check that it does not 
suffer from other defects that have not yet been highlighted through considering 
the desiderata. Accordingly, before concluding, I will consider and respond to 
three criticisms of the norm- relevancy account.
4.1. Cisnormativity
Andler (2017) argues that the norm- relevancy account is ‘cisnormative’ because 
it requires us to ‘problematically [conceptualize] all gender identity through a 
28. Exactly how these definitions are interpreted will depend on how the cut- off points are 
defined for male, non- binary and female gender identities in terms of how many norms a person 
experiences as relevant, and issue that I lack space to address here (see Footnote 22 above). I antici-
pate that a full response to this point might include some fuzzy boundaries.
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cisgender frame’. This charge is partly based on a misconception about how 
the norm- relevancy account would respond to cases of trans people who have 
embodiments that are non- normative for their identified gender but who ex-
perience this as unproblematic— for example, a trans woman who experiences 
her penis straightforwardly as a womanly body part. Andler contends that the 
norm- relevancy account cannot categorise such people as members of the gen-
der they consider themselves to be. In fact, the norm- relevancy account can yield 
the expected result in such cases because, as explained above, it does not require 
a person to be ‘tuned in’ to all of the norms associated with the relevant gender. 
The trans woman who experiences her penis as a womanly body part is not ex-
periencing the norm ‘women should not have penises’ as relevant to her. On the 
norm- relevancy account, if she does experience other norms of femininity as rel-
evant to her, then she has a female gender identity. However, setting this confu-
sion aside, the charge of cisnormativity can also be seen as a response to the fact 
that the norm- relevancy account defines gender identity by reference to gender 
classes, which are currently highly cissexist in character, which is to say that they 
privilege the experiences of cis people whilst undermining the experiences of 
trans people, and thus systematically function to the detriment of trans people.
It is important to pause here and ask, what exactly is meant by ‘cisnorma-
tive’? Andler certainly understands this to be negative property, even (given the 
overall thrust of the article) a fatal defect in a definition of gender identity con-
sidered as a proposed target concept. It seems, then, that we should understand 
‘cisnormative’ to apply to accounts that inappropriately centre cis experience, for 
example by endorsing cissexist standards. On this interpretation, however, the 
norm- relevancy account is not cisnormative, for although it treats current gen-
der classes as a point of reference, and although these roles are cissexist, it does 
not endorse these standards. On the other hand, if any centring of cis experiences 
suffices for an account to be cisnormative, whether appropriate or inappropri-
ate, then the norm- relevancy account’s use of current gender roles does render it 
cisnormative, but it is not clear why this should be considered a problem: since 
these classes are the ones that currently exist and we must all contend with them, 
at least for now, taking them as a point of reference seems appropriate. Indeed, 
it is not clear to me what a substantive account of gender identity could success-
fully use as a reference point other than some feature of our gendered social 
structure, such as gender classes or (as in the case of the dispositional account) 
gender stereotypes— all of which are at present cissexist. In what sense would an 
account be an account of gender identity if it was not linked to the material reality 
of gender as a feature of social structures? If this is right, then for as long as our 
gendered social structure is cissexist, accounts of gender identity will involve 
‘centring cis experiences’ in the very thin sense of taking these cissexist social 
structures as a reference point. Of course, if gender classes changed so as to be-
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come less cissexist, as they may do in the future, accounts of gender identity, too, 
would become less cis- centred.
There is, then, an equivocation in the term ‘cisnormative’ as employed by 
Andler. On one way of resolving this equivocation it turns out that the term does 
constitute a genuine defect but is not applicable to the norm- relevancy account; 
on the other, the term is applicable to the norm- relevancy account (and, I sus-
pect, to any other substantive and non- circular account of gender identity) but 
does not constitute a genuine defect.
4.2. Epistemic vs. Ethical FPA
A second criticism of the norm- relevancy account is made by Bettcher (2017). 
As explained in the previous section in relation to the norm- relevancy account’s 
ability to meet D2, Bettcher points out that the norm- relevancy account does not 
give the expected results about gender identity in the case of some trans people. 
I return to this here because the context in which this observation is made in-
dicates that Bettcher considers this fact to be grounds for rejecting the norm- 
relevancy account considered as a proposed target concept. One way to read 
this worry is to interpret it as an objection not to the norm- relevancy account as 
an account of gender identity, but to the norm- relevancy account as a solution to the 
‘inclusion problem’, that is, the question of how to define the ‘subject’ of feminism, 
which is how I previously presented it (Jenkins 2016).29 In this case, the worry 
is not relevant to the ameliorative project I am concerned with here, which does 
not aim to address the inclusion problem.30
There is, however, another interpretation of Bettcher’s worry on which it is 
relevant to my present purposes, which is to interpret her as claiming that a tar-
get concept of gender identity ought to have an extension that perfectly matches 
people’s descriptions of their own (current) gender identities. This amounts to 
proposing that D2 be altered so that as to require compatibility not merely with 
ethical FPA, but with the more demanding epistemic FPA. Since epistemic FPA 
requires that no- one can be wrong about their own gender identity, the norm- 
relevancy account would not be able to meet such a revised desideratum.
The upshot of this is that Bettcher’s objection to the norm- relevancy account, 
if it is a challenge at all in the context of the present ameliorative inquiry, is a 
challenge to the desiderata I have set out, rather than to the norm- relevancy 
account’s ability to meet those desiderata. Since Bettcher touches on this issue 
only briefly, it is somewhat difficult to assess this challenge. There are, as far as 
I can see, no reasons to prefer epistemic FPA to ethical FPA, and indeed Bettcher 
29. See Footnote 24 above.
30. For a critique of the inclusion problem, see Mikkola (2016).
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herself, in her 2009 paper, explicitly argues in favour of ethical FPA and against 
epistemic FPA. It is not fully clear why she then appears to favour epistemic FPA 
in her 2017 paper; one possibility is that she is simply responding to my mistak-
en claim that the norm- relevancy account entails that everyone has the gender 
identity that they think they have, by showing what an account that really did 
have this consequence would need to look like.
Furthermore, a shift to a version of D2 that required epistemic FPA and could 
not be satisfied by ethical FPA alone would, I think, raise some problems. To see 
why this is so, let us look again at Bettcher’s self- identification account, which 
is the only account out of the three considered here which is compatible with 
epistemic FPA (more precisely, it is compatible with synchronic epistemic FPA). 
As we saw, the self- identification account is unable to meet D1, the requirement 
to show that gender identity is important and deserves respect. These two things 
are linked: the self- identification account is only able to support (synchronic) 
epistemic FPA in virtue of placing extremely minimal requirements on having 
a certain gender identity— and it is that very same minimalism that leaves the 
account without resources when it comes to showing why gender identity is sig-
nificant. It seems to me that this tension would arise for different accounts, such 
that any account that is sufficiently minimal to secure epistemic FPA would be 
insufficiently substantive to meet D1, and vice versa. If this is right, then moving 
to a version of D2 that required compatibility with epistemic FPA would mean 
abandoning D1. Given the importance of D1 to the aims of trans rights move-
ments, this seems highly undesirable.
Certainly, an account of gender identity that entailed that everyone has the 
gender identity that they think they have whilst also meeting all of the desidera-
ta (including D1) would be preferable to the norm- relevancy account. But given 
that no such account has been offered so far, and given, too, that there seems 
to be cause for pessimism about the prospect for developing one, I continue to 
think that the norm- relevancy account is a good candidate for the target concept 
of gender identity.
4.3. Gender Classes and Desiring Subordination
Unlike the first two objections, the third and final objection that I will consid-
er has not, to my knowledge, been made in print.31 The objection concerns the 
role of gender classes— understood as coercively imposed and hierarchical in 
nature— in the norm- relevancy account. It goes as follows: According to the 
norm- relevancy account, trans women are people who have been classed as men 
31. It has been raised to me in conversation by Stephanie Kapusta, among others, and I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address it here.
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whilst having a female gender identity, and who often seek to change their so-
cial position so that they are classed as women. Given the account’s reliance on 
an analysis of gender classes as intrinsically hierarchical, this means that many 
trans women actively seek to become members of a subordinated social group. 
This seems to imply either that those trans women must be confused about the 
nature of gender, or that they must desire their own subordination; both impli-
cations are unpalatable.
There are two ways to respond to this objection, depending on whether one 
agrees with the analysis of gender classes, that is, the claim that gendered social 
roles are intrinsically hierarchical in nature. Assessing the analysis of gender 
classes is beyond the scope of this article. Accordingly, I shall show that the 
norm- relevancy account can be defended from the objection whatever stance 
one takes on gender classes.
Someone who rejects the analysis of gender classes can simply modify the 
account to detach it from that analysis, and ‘plug in’ a different, non- hierarchical 
account of gendered social roles. This would involve simply changing all refer-
ences to ‘gender classes’ to ‘gendered social roles’, and offering an account of the 
nature of these roles. This is a very straightforward modification and completely 
defuses the objection.
If, on the other hand, one does agree with the analysis of gender classes that 
Haslanger and I endorse, then the situation is slightly more complex. What is 
required is a way of responding to the apparent dilemma of having to say either 
that trans women who seek to transition are confused, or that they desire their 
own subordination. First, let’s get clearer on the nature of the dilemma. One 
thing that is worth noting is that the majority of people don’t understand gen-
der classes as hierarchical, which means that trans women are not singled out 
as especially confused relative to other groups. The real problem with the first 
horn of the dilemma is not the implication that trans women are confused as 
such, but rather the more specific implication that trans women would not desire 
to transition if they understood the nature of gender classes accurately. This is 
indeed a problematic claim relative to the present ameliorative inquiry, in the 
sense that it would seriously undermine the aims of trans rights movements. So 
the unpalatable implications are, on the one hand, that trans women only seek 
to transition because they are confused, and on the other, that trans women who 
seek to transition desire their own subordination.
What is needed, then, is a way of showing that a trans woman could ac-
curately understand the hierarchical nature of gendered social roles, not desire 
to be subordinated, and still desire to transition. One obvious option is to say 
that what such a trans woman may desire is congruence between the norms she 
experiences as relevant and the norms others apply to her. Given the explana-
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tion of the significance of such congruence for social agency, this seems like a 
very reasonable and intelligible desire.32 A trans woman in this position would 
most likely view becoming a member of a subordinated social group as a cost of 
transition, an unwelcome side effect of the thing that she actually desires, mean-
ing that she would not in fact be desiring her own subordination. The appeal 
of this solution is further strengthened by the fact that in a society that rigidly 
polices gender norms, a trans woman may well be subordinated in virtue of not 
conforming to masculine gender norms even before she transitions. If this is so, 
transitioning would be a matter of exchanging one form of subordination for an-
other, where the exchange also brings significant benefits in terms of congruence 
between perceived gender and gender identity. It’s hard to see how this could 
be deemed irrational.
What about cases where a trans women not only desires this type of congru-
ence, but actually desires to comply with norms of femininity without being 
seen as transgressing gender norms? For example, a trans woman may wish to 
be able to dress in a way that is considered feminine without being targeted for 
harassment. (Again, it is worth noting that this desire is one that is shared by 
many cis women, so trans women are not being singled out as desiring some-
thing unusual.) A critic of the norm- relevancy account might contend that in 
these cases, the account does entail that the trans woman desires her own subor-
dination. Now, the relationship between particular gender norms and gender 
classes as such is a complex one; but in the interests of strengthening the critic’s 
position as much as possible, let us grant that all norms of femininity are impli-
cated in subordination insofar as they function as markers of subordinate status. 
Is desiring to do things that are markers of subordinate status the same as desir-
ing that one be subordinated? I think not. One can desire the markers for their 
own sake without desiring to have the status that they serve to indicate. Here, 
again, we are able to say that the trans woman does not desire her own sub-
ordination, but merely desires something which, unfortunately for her, brings 
subordination along with it.
The norm- relevancy account does not, therefore, entail that trans women 
only seek to transition because they are confused, nor that trans women who 
seek to transition desire their own subordination. It allows for trans women to 
have a full and accurate understanding of the nature of gender classes and gen-
der norms, to desire not to be subordinated, and still to make a rational choice 
to transition.
32. See Section 3.3 above.
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5. Concluding Remarks: A Framework for Further Investigation
I have assessed the three analytic accounts of gender identity developed to date— 
the dispositional, self- identification, and norm- relevancy accounts— in light of 
the desiderata I developed for the ameliorative project, and I have argued that, 
of these three accounts, the norm- relevancy account (slightly extended to better 
accommodate non- binary identities) is the best candidate for the target concept. 
Moreover, I have defended the norm- relevancy account from three objections. 
This suggests that the account is not only the best candidate out of the three con-
sidered, but a strong candidate more generally.
It is seldom wise in writing a philosophy paper to aim to deliver the last 
word on some question, but in this case in particular such an ambition would be 
especially ill- advised. The topic is one which analytic philosophers have only re-
cently begun to discuss, and which is of tremendous ethical and political signifi-
cance. Caution is therefore appropriate. There may be considerations I have not 
taken into account that affect how we should conceive of the desiderata, and en-
tirely new accounts may be developed that are preferable to the norm- relevancy 
account in various ways. I therefore provisionally and cautiously recommend the 
norm- relevancy account as the target concept of gender identity that is needed 
by trans rights movements.
The main contribution I hope to have made in this paper is not so much to ad-
vocate for a particular target concept as to clear the ground for better and clearer 
discussions of gender identity in the future by providing a framework for fur-
ther investigation. Those who disagree that the norm- relevancy definition cap-
tures the target concept of gender identity for an ameliorative inquiry based on 
the aims of trans rights movements must either (a) disagree with me about what 
the desiderata for that ameliorative inquiry ought to be, (b) disagree with me 
about how one or more of the accounts I have considered fares relative to these 
desiderata, or (c) have a novel account to offer that fares better than the norm- 
relevancy account (or, of course, be doing some combination of these things). It 
is also the case that other concepts of gender identity may be proposed as part 
of different projects of conceptual analysis, descriptive or prescriptive/ameliora-
tive. I gladly anticipate that lively disagreement concerning gender identity will 
continue, and I hope that the framework I have developed helps to clarify the 
nature of these discussions and so render them as productive as possible.
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